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Abstract—Supply Shortage Outages are a major concern
during peak demand for developing countries. In the Philip-
pines, commercial loads have unused backup generation of
up to 3000 MW, at the same time there are shortages of as
much as 700 MW during peak demand. This gives utilities the
incentive to implement Demand Response programs to minimize
this shortage. But when considering Demand Response from a
modeling perspective, social welfare through profit is always the
major objective for program implementation. That isn’t always
the case during an emergency situation as there can be a trade-
off between grid resilience and cost of electricity.
The question is how the Distribution Utility (DU) shall
optimally allocate the unused generation to meet the shortage
when this trade-off exists. We formulate a combined multi-
objective optimal dispatch model where we can make a direct
comparison between the least-cost and resilience objectives.
We find that this trade-off is due to the monotonically
increasing nature of energy cost functions. If the supply is larger
than the demand, the DU can perform a least-cost approach in
the optimal dispatch since maximizing the energy generated in
this case can lead to multiple solutions. We also find in our
simulation that in cases where the supply of energy from the
customers is less than shortage quantity, the DU must prioritize
maximizing the generated energy rather than minimizing cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is potential to increase the reliability1 of electricity
grids during Supply Shortage Outages (SSO). This can done
through the use of the in-house distributed generation of
commercial and industrial loads. In fact, in the Philippines,
there is as much as 3000 MW worth of unused distributed
power through these generators even with energy crisis of as
much as 700MW [1]. Therefore, there is an incentive for the
regulator to implement a Demand Side Management (DSM)
program [2] to allow distribution utilities (DU) to contract
certain commercial establishments to either (1) reduce energy
consumption, or (2) use their in-house generators during peak
demand. We put our attention on the latter case.
In the literature, managing energy demand through incen-
tive contracts fall in the realm of Demand Response (DR) [3].
The US Department of Energy defines Demand Response
as ”Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from
their normal consumption patterns in response to changes in
the price of electricity over time, or to incentive payments
designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopar-
dized” [4]. Specifically, we are dealing with the Interruptible
Load Program (ILP) [3].
1Or resiliency.
For most cases in DR, and DSM in general, profits, social
welfare, and prices are put into the spotlight in the design of
these programs [2], [3]. In certain cases, such as emergency
situations, this approach may leave the implementation of
certain DR schemes ineffective in increasing resiliency. Most
of the time during emergency situations, the amount of short-
age in a distribution system would be too high for the PCs
to be able to fully compensate the shortage. This is because
generation is usually not part of the core competencies of the
PCs.
Resilience must then be explicitly considered because there
may be a trade-off between the minimization of cost, and the
minimization of the shortage. Therefore, this paper focuses
on creating a mechanism that considers both the allocation of
the amount of energy each PC must generate through a least-
cost optimal dispatch, or by increasing grid resiliency. This
is done through a modified optimal energy dispatch model
for the distributed generators of the PCs [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
II, we review the different DR mechanism with the goal of
optimizing social welfare through profit [6]. In Section III,
we develop the agent model and make assumptions on their
cost functions. In Section IV and V, we formulate the optimal
dispatch models, and analyze their properties. In Section VI,
we show a simulation on the proposed model. We conclude
this paper in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
DR techniques are used to shift consumption patterns as
a solution to reduce energy shortage [2], [3]. The drawback
to using DR is that these methods do not necessarily reduce
energy consumption as shifting demand may lead to profiles
with new peaks [2]. To fix this problem, DR methods can
also involve methods that induce consumers to generate their
own energy [3].
There are two kinds of DR strategies that are currently be-
ing used: incentive-based and time-based DR [3]. Incentive-
based DR schemes refer to programs where DUs give incen-
tives to customers to influence consumption and generation,
while time-based DR schemes refer to mechanisms where
DUs modify prices throughout the day to influence consump-
tion patterns [7].
Work has been done to discuss a competitive market model
for demand response assuming firms are price-takers under a
profit-maximization model [8], [9]. Gadham and Ghose show
how social welfare, as the sum of consumer and producer sur-
plus, is affected when the equilibrium price change through a
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sensitivity analysis [10]. Chen and Low model social welfare
maximization through a residential demand response scheme
where each household operates different appliances [11].
Nijhuis, et al. implemented a demand response program at a
franchise level using the elasticity of aggregated demand [12].
Also, we see that Sabounchi, et al. defined social welfare as
the preferences of a consumer using the aggregate energy
consumed of all devices in the household [13]. Chen, et al.
created two market models for DR under the assumption of
a perfect competition, and an oligopoly [14]. Also, Su, and
Kirschen quantify how social welfare, defined as the sum of
the utility functions, is affected as the number of participating
customers (PC) increases [15].
Common among the incentive-based schemes is that DUs
contract to affect consumption rather than explicitly contract
to generate energy. Another issue with most DR mechanisms
is that they mostly consider social welfare through profit
optimization. In cases where there are SSOs, this objective
may lead to the ineffective implementation of the program
because of a possible trade-off between cost and resilience.
With the Philippines, since there are a lot commercial
establishments have their own distributed generators, it is
more efficient to contract with the latter case. With that in
mind, it is also not explicitly mentioned how the DU opti-
mally allocates the amount of shortage each PC is required
to generate. Therefore, we focus our attention on how the
DU shall allocate the amount of shortage through a modified
optimal dispatch [5].
Traditionally, optimal dispatch problems have the objective
of minimizing the cost to buy a certain amount of power
from the generation sector [5]. Barley and Winn study
choosing an optimal energy mix with corresponding dispatch
strategies for microgrids [16]. Traditionally, optimal dispatch
problems are implemented for generators competing in the
transmission system [17]. Also, it is standard to model
dispatch problems as a deterministic model, but Viviani and
Heydt model stochastic optimal dispatch problems where the
parameters are random variables, and the agents are risk-
averse [18]. Research has also been done by Baran and El-
Markabi to model optimal dispatch in distribution systems
with the objective of minimizing the total reactive power
dispatched to regulate the voltage in distribution feeders [19].
Also, DallAnese, et al. implemented the optimal dispatch of
photovoltaic systems in residential distribution systems [20].
Common among all the optimal dispatch models is the
knowledge that the market is operating with a business as
usual. Since we are dealing with SSOs, the objective of the
DU in the dispatch may change drastically. Therefore in our
case, we will study whether it is still efficient to implement
a least-cost optimal dispatch when resilience can also be a
big issue in cases when there are SSOs.
III. AGENT MODEL
A. Agent Cost Function
In this section, we discuss the preliminary definitions and
assumptions for the model. We begin by defining the costs
for each PC.
Definition 1. For a set of PCs {1, ...,N} where the PC i ∈
{1, ...,N}, Let θi ∈ Θi denote the unit price of generating
e¯i ∈ Ei ⊆ R≥0 amount of energy for the PC.
We define the cost of the PC i to generate e¯i to be Ci :
Ei×Θi→ R≥0.
In a standard optimal dispatch problem, this is the cost to
produce e¯i amount of energy for PC i. The goal of the DU
is to minimize the overall cost to society as mandated by the
system regulator.
We state the assumed properties of the cost function model
for each PC to generate his own electricity. We base this on
the standard cost model [6] used in microeconomics.
Assumption 1. The generator cost function Ci(e¯i,θi)∈C2 is
continuous, twice differentiable2, and monotonically increas-
ing in e¯i and θi, while convex in e¯i and concave in θi.
This assumption is reasonable as most distributed genera-
tors do have a convex cost function [5].
Lastly, we make define the DU demand.
Definition 2. The total DU demand is e¯ ∈ R≥0.
This implies that the DU demand e¯ is an external variable
that is dependent on the nature of the SSO. In the economics
literature, this means that the e¯ is exogenous [6].
B. Agent Generator Constraints
In this section, we characterize the capacity of the gen-
erators being operated by the PC. In a market setting, it is
sufficient to characterize the generator using an inequality
constraint [5].
Assumption 2. The PC has a maximum average power
consumption of Pmaxi ∈ R>0.
This can be justified because PCs generally have finite
average power consumption. Since most ILPs last only a few
hours, the amount of energy they would need to generate is
finite.
Next we need to assume the minimum power consumption
each generator shall take. In the literature [5], it is usually
assumed that each generator generates a minimum of 0W . In
our case, generating 0W is akin to not participating in the
contract at all, and is undesirable when one signs up for ILP.
Assumption 3. The PC is always required to join the
program and generate energy with a minimum average power
consumption of Pmini > 0 where P
min
i ∈ R and Pmaxi > Pmini .
Since ILP programs mostly have energies as an input
instead of power [21], the next remark combines both the
previous assumptions.
Remark 1. The PC satisfies the inequality constraint 0 <
Pmini ≤ e¯iT ≤ Pmaxi for the optimal dispatch problem.
2C2 is the space of continuous functions with 2nd derivatives
In this model, e¯iT =Pi where Pi is assumed to be the average
power consumed during the ILP.
IV. COST-BASED OPTIMAL DISPATCH MODEL
In this Section, we discuss the least-cost based model for
being able to do optimal energy dispatch.
A. Market Clearing Constraint
First, we state an assumption3 on the nature of the supply
of the DGs.
Assumption 4. The PCs can always supply as much as the
DU demands.
The previous assumption is only valid when the sum
of the maximum generator constraints satisfy the following
relationship:
T
N
∑
i=1
Pmaxi ≥ e¯. (1)
This is a strong assumption because it is not always the
case that the DGs of the PCs can supply enough to clear the
shortage. We will see in the section V that if this property
does not hold, the feasibility set in the optimization problem
is empty.
With this, the market clearing constraint [6] is
N
∑
i=1
e¯i = e¯. (2)
The market clearing constraint implies that any combina-
tion of e¯i ∀i can be used as long as it satisfies (2). We call
this homogeneity since each e¯i can be replaced by any e¯ j for
j 6= i [6].
B. Cost Optimization Problem
We base our optimization problem on a dispatch that
minimizes the total cost to generate e¯. Therefore, with the
market clearing constraint and the generation constraints, the
optimization problem is
min
[e¯1,e¯2,...,e¯N ]
N
∑
i=1
Ci(e¯i,θi). (3)
subject to:
Pmini ≤
e¯i
T
≤ Pmaxi ∀i
N
∑
i=1
e¯i = e¯.
The next Lemma shows when the problem is feasible with
a global optimal solution [5].
Lemma 1. If T ∑Ni=1 Pmaxi ≥ e¯ and Assumption 1 is satisfied,
then there exists a global optimal solution, [e¯1, ..., e¯N ]T , that
satisfies (3).
Intuitively, this means that the sum of the maximum
capacities must be greater than the demand for there to be a
3Only valid in this section.
solution. If the premise is not satisfied, then no combination
of [e¯1, ..., e¯N ]T will satisfy the market clearing constraint. We
treat this case in the next section.
V. MODIFIED OPTIMAL DISPATCH MODEL FOR
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
In reality, such as in emergency situations due to SSOs,
the amount of shortage is almost always too high such that
the total amount of energy the PCs generate is not enough to
cover the shortage. With that, In this section, we analyze this
case where Lemma 1 because Assumption 4 is not satisfied.
More concisely, we consider the case where the DGs don’t
have the capacity to clear the shortages.
To preempt the results from this section, we show that the
trade-off between resilience and cost is due to the inefficiency
of the least-cost objective in minimizing the shortage. This
is due to Assumption 1. With that, we form a multi-objective
optimal dispatch problem that can characterize this trade-off.
A. Market Clearing Constraint Breakdown
The next Lemma formally states what happens when
Assumption 4, which assures Lemma 1, does not hold.
Lemma 2. If T ∑Ni=1 Pmaxi < e¯, then the feasible set that
satisfies (3) is empty.
This just means that if the individual maximum capacities
don’t add up to the shortage, then there is no way the market
clears. This is an issue because Lemma 2 implies there is no
feasible solution to the optimal dispatch problem.
We combine Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to produce the
following Theorem.
Theorem 1. T ∑Ni=1 Pmaxi ≥ e¯ iff ∃ a [e¯1, ..., e¯N ]T that satisfies
(3) and Assumption 1.
Theorem 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for the feasibility of (3).
When considering emergency situations where supply of
energy from the PCs can’t meet demand, as formalized in
Theorem 1, we quantify this insight by relaxing the market
cleating constraint with
N
∑
i=1
e¯i ≤ e¯. (4)
In this case where supply can’t meet demand, the aggregate
energy supply the PCs produce will always be less than e¯.
B. Least-Cost Objective Trade-Off
As stated previously, we are dealing with the problem of
minimizing the total cost of the N PCs subject to the relaxed
market clearing constraint.
An issue here is that minimizing the cost that is monoton-
ically increasing subject to (4) leads to a trade-off with grid
resiliency - a big objective of DR.
Theorem 2. If ∃ a [e¯1, ..., e¯N ]T that satisfies (3) while
relaxing the market clearing constraint, then e¯i = T Pmini .
This is because with a monotonically increasing cost
function found in Assumption 1, [e¯1, ..., e¯N ]T would minimize
the total cost by dispatching the minimum amount of energy,
T Pmini , the PCs can generate while in the program.
This result is troublesome as the ultimate goal of a DR
scheme during SSOs is to minimize the total shortage. Using
a least-cost objective would necessarily decrease the system’s
resilience, and would render any incentive-based DR scheme
for energy generation during emergency situations useless.
Therefore, we consider adding to the least-cost objective the
objective of minimizing the shortage in the sequel.
C. Resilience Objective
Since the DU cannot tell PCs to generate sufficient energy,
we add a second objective to maximize the amount of energy
generated. This is equivalent to minimizing the shortage
during the SSO. Therefore, we consider another objective
max
[e¯1,...,e¯i]
N
∑
i=1
e¯i. (5)
We characterize the solution to this problem in the next
Remark.
Lemma 3. The optimization of (5) with the same constraints
as (3) has multiple optimizers if the generator constraints for
each PC i are not all tight at the optimal solution of the new
problem.
Therefore, for cases where supply of energy is greater than
demand, the DU still has to decide which optimal solution it
will use for the allocation. In this case, we recommend the
DU to use the standard least-cost dispatch.
D. Multi-Objective Optimal Dispatch
Lastly, because of the trade-off between least cost and least
shortage, DUs generally don’t want to focus a big chunk
their resources in minimizing their energy due to a loss
of revenue. Therefore, we formulate the modified optimal
dispatch problem as a multi-objective convex optimization
problem [22].
With the objectives and the constraints laid out, the gen-
eralized optimal dispatch problem, after regularization [22],
is then
min
[e¯1,...,e¯i]
λ
N
∑
i=1
Ci(e¯i,θi)− (1−λ )
N
∑
i=1
e¯i. (6)
subject to:
Pmini ≤
e¯i
T
≤ Pmaxi ∀i
N
∑
i=1
e¯i ≤ e¯.
Since the model is convex [22], all we need to do is prove
that there is a feasible set to state a necessary and sufficient
condition for global optimality.
Theorem 3. The feasible set of (6) is non-empty.
Notice how the regularization of the problem differs
slightly from the standard Tikhonov Regularization [22]. This
has some analytic and interpretive significance. The solution
to the optimal dispatch problem is going to be a Pareto
Frontier [22] from λ ∈ [0,1] instead of λ ∈ R≥0.
The value of λ then could be interpreted as the ratio of
how much the DU should prioritize ones cost objective over
the resilience objective. If λ = 0 then the firm prioritizes
resilience. The cost objective is prioritized when λ = 1. With
this framework, firms can do a sensitivity analysis on λ to
see whether or not they should opt to prioritize minimizing
the shortage or minimizing their costs. If we characterize the
Pareto Frontier of the optimal solution, we are able to see the
effectiveness of the program when one prioritizes one cost
over resilience.
VI. APPLICATION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide a simple analysis of the claim
above. Consider the quadratic fuel cost function (7). We
consider three cases for this application:
1) λ Sensitivity Analysis
2) Cost-Based Optimal Dispatch
A. Assumed Cost Function
In general, any cost function that satisfies the properties
found in any standard graduate microeconomic theory text-
book [6] will work, but as is usual for power engineering, we
modify the standard quadratic fuel cost curve for the purpose
of application [5].
Assuming the generator generates an average power e¯T , the
fuel cost function is
Ci(e¯i,θi) = T [a2θi(
e¯i
T
)2+a1θi(
e¯i
T
)+a0θi] (7)
for some cost parameters a2,a1,a0 ∈R,a2 > 0, and length of
shortage T .
The quadratic component corresponds to all nonlinear
variable costs present due to system nonlinearities such as
starting and stopping the generator. The linear term is a vari-
able cost that represents the cost of operating and maintaining
the generator at steady-state. The a0 term represents all fixed
costs [5].
B. Optimal Dispatch Simulation Parameters
We consider implementing the analysis of the optimal
dispatch problems with 5 PCs. We set Pmini = 30kW ∀i.
The maximum average generation for each PC to be Pmax =
[60,100,125,85,130]T kW . We consider an ILP where T =
1hr. We consider the generator parameters given in Table
I [23].
C. λ Sensitivity Analysis
We consider Pmini = 30kW ∀i, and e¯ = 700kWhr because
700kWhr > 500kWhr = T ∑Pmaxi In this case, we consider
how the dispatch changes when the parameter λ changes.
Figure 1 shows how the dispatch is sensitive to λ .
TABLE I
GENERATOR PARAMETERS
Parameter PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5
a0θ 96.6 96.6046 96.279 100.3937 95.856
a1θ 7.588 7.5874 7.592 6.9761 7.374
a2θ 0.0414 0.0414 0.042 0.0533 0.047
Fig. 1. PC Relaxed Optimal Dispatch Sensitivity With Respect to λ
We observe that the dispatch remains constant until around
λ = 0.05. This implies that the effect of minimizing costs
starts to dominate even when the DU prioritizes maximizing
energy generated more. In fact, the cost objective totally
dominates when λ ≥ 0.09, which is less than λ = 0.5 where
the DU prioritizes the two objectives equally. Therefore,
when an SSO occurs during an emergency situation, the DU
must decide to prioritize maximizing energy generated more
than minimizing the total cost to generate.
D. Cost-Based Optimal Dispatch
For cases where the supply of electricity is greater than
the demand due to a shortage, we use Remark 3 to justify
using a Cost-Based Optimal Dispatch.
We consider checking the sensitivity of the Strict Dispatch
from e¯ = 150kWhr to e¯ = 500kWhr. 150kWhr was chosen
because the ∑Pmini = 150kW.
Figure 2 shows how the optimal dispatch changes when
the total shortage increases from 150kWhr to 500kWhr.
It can be seen that the dispatch monotonically increases
with respect to e¯ until one PC’s full capacity is reached.
We observe the behavior that when firm j reaches its full
capacity, the rate of change of the dispatch ∀i 6= j increases.
This implies that the DU demands more from the other PCs
marginally when PC i reaches full capacity.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we develop an optimal dispatch model for
allocating generation during supply shortage outages (SSO)
in emergency situations. This is for the development of the
Fig. 2. PC Dispatch Sensitivity With Respect to e¯
Interruptible Load Program. We develop a model for opti-
mal dispatch for SSOs by modifying the least-cost optimal
dispatch found in standard literature [5].
Using the modified model, we have found that when the
supply of energy provided by the contracted establishments is
less than the shortage demand, there is a trade-off between the
resilience of the dispatch with the cost. This is because using
the least-cost approach may lead to the inefficient imple-
mentation of the program since grid resilience will increase
minimally. Mathematically, this inefficiency is caused by the
reasonable assumption that costs are monotonically increas-
ing in the amount of energy. Characterizing this inefficiency
is crucial for the interruptible load program as grid resilience
should be of top priority during emergency situations.
Though, for special cases where all the total number of
PCs can cover the energy shortage, we recommend using
a least-cost approach as it will not lead to the inefficient
implementation of the mechanism.
In this model, we have considered PCs that are taken to be
price-takers. Also, in this model, we have assumed that the
generation prices and valuations are known such that the PCs
can’t cheat the system by raising prices. Lastly, the model
breaks down in the case where the cost is not a linear function
of price [6].
In future studies, we consider energy with significant
market power such that they can influence the price. We also
consider the case where the energy valuations of each PC is
unknown. This can be done by implementing through either a
uniform or discriminatory price auction. Finally, we consider
models where the costs are not a linear function of the unit
price commonly found in contract models [6].
APPENDIX
In this section, we provide the proofs for Lemma 1, Lemma
2, Theorem 2, Lemma 3, and Theorem 3. Theorem 1 is not
included as it is a direct consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Xi = [Pmini ,P
max
i ] ∈ R>0. Since
Pmaxi = sup{Xi}, ∑Ni=1 T Pmaxi ≥ e¯, and Pmaxi ≥ 0, take P¯i ≥ 0
∀i s.t. ∑Ni=1 T (Pmaxi − P¯i) = e¯.
Since Pmaxi − P¯i ∈ Xi, then ∃ [x1 ∈ X1,x2 ∈ X2, ...,xN ∈ XN ]T
that satisfies (3).
Additionally, since Assumption 1 implies that the problem
is convex [22], then the solution is a global optima. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Xi = [Pmini ,P
max
i ] ⊂ R>0. Since
∑Ni=1 T Pmaxi < e¯, and Pmaxi = sup{Xi}, then any xi ∈ Xi ∀i will
lead to ∑Ni=1 T xi < ∑
N
i=1 T P
max
i < e¯.
Therefore, @ [x1 ∈ X1,x2 ∈ X2, ...,xN ∈ XN ]T that satisfies
(1). Therefore, the feasible set of (3) is empty. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Xi = [Pmini ,P
max
i ] ∈ R>0. Since the
cost function is monotonically increasing, argmine¯ Ci(e¯i,θi)
subject to the minimimum generation constraint is T Pmini .

Proof of Lemma 3. Restating the contrapositive, we have ”If
the solution to (3) replacing the objective with (5) is unique,
then the generator constraints for each PC i are all tight in
the new problem.” We prove this by contradiction.
Let e= [e¯11, ..., e¯1i] be an optimal solution to the problem.
Let x ∈ R≥0 where min{e}< x < max{e} s.t. min{e}+ x is
less than T Pmaxj for its corresponding j ∈ {1, ...,N}. This is
possible by the completeness of the reals.
We can take the vector e∗ = [e¯11, ..., e¯1i] s.t. max{e∗} =
max{e}− x, and min{e∗} = min{e}+ x. Since this is also
an optimal solution, we have a contradiction on uniqueness
- proving the contrapositive. ⊥ 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Xi = [Pmini ,P
max
i ] ∈ R>0. Take e¯iT =
Pmaxi +P
min
i
2 . Thus, ∑
N
i=1
e¯i
T = ∑
N
i=1
Pmaxi +P
min
i
2 ≤ ∑Ni=1 Pmaxi .
Therefore, since ∑Ni=1
e¯i
T ≤ ∑Ni=1 Pmaxi , then ∑Ni=1 e¯i ≤
∑Ni=1 T Pmaxi = e¯. Therefore, The feasible set is non-
empty. 
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